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ABSTRACT. When the availability of a vital resource varies between times of overabundance and extreme scarcity, management
regimes must manifest flexibility and authority to adapt while maintaining legitimacy. Unfortunately, the need for adaptability
often conflicts with the desire for certainty in legal and regulatory regimes, and laws that fail to account for variability often
result in conflict when the inevitable disturbance occurs. Additional keys to resilience are collaboration among physical scientists,
political actors, local leaders, and other stakeholders, and, when the commons is shared among sovereign states, collaboration
between and among institutions with authority to act at different scales or with respect to different aspects of an ecological
system. At the scale of transboundary river basins, where treaties govern water utilization, particular treaty mechanisms can
reduce conflict potential by fostering collaboration and accounting for change. One necessary element is a mechanism for
coordination and collaboration at the scale of the basin. This could be satisfied by mechanisms ranging from informal networks
to the establishment of an international commission to jointly manage water, but a mechanism for collaboration at the basin
scale alone does not ensure sound water management. To better guide resource management, study of applied resilience theory
has revealed a number of management practices that are integral for adaptive governance. Here, we describe key resilience
principles for treaty design and adaptive governance and then apply the principles to a case study of one transboundary basin
where the need and willingness to manage collaboratively and iteratively is high—the Okavango River Basin of southwest
Africa. This descriptive and applied approach should be particularly instructive for treaty negotiators, transboundary resource
managers, and should aid program developers.
Key Words: adaptive governance; international water law; Okavango; resilience; transboundary water governance; treaty
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INTRODUCTION
The interactions among a society, its government agencies,
and the ecosystems they manage, create great challenges when
dealing with cross-scale issues such as transboundary water
governance (Cash et al. 2006, Benson and Garmestani 2011).
Law plays a key role in shaping policy and management
actions that influence the trajectory of ecosystem health
(Garmestani et al. 2009). Given that law is both a driver of
and means to implementing environmental policy and
governance, legal analysis is essential for understanding
policy success and failure, and for developing solutions.
Emerging studies reveal that current strict legal regimes are
ill-suited for dealing with transboundary resources because
they are designed around an outdated conception of social–
ecological systems (Benson and Garmestani 2011).
Environmental and natural resource management laws arose
from an engineering perspective geared toward reducing
environmental variation, eliminating uncertainty (Anderies
2006), and optimizing for key resource values (Walker and
Salt 2006). However, by suppressing natural dynamics,
engineered systems may actually be more vulnerable to
random disturbance, resulting in an overall reduction of
resilience in the system (Anderies 2006, Cosens 2013, Cosens
et al. 2012). 
The solution to the resilience problem may be adaptive
management, initially developed as a methodology for
ecosystem management (Holling 1978). Fundamentally,
adaptive management attempts to reduce the uncertainty
associated with managing ecosystems by continuously
learning about the system, in contrast to engineering away
uncertainty. Much of the uncertainty in ecosystem
management is a result of nonlinear dynamics, and
understanding system dynamics is vital to understanding and
managing the system. Thus, the most critical steps in adaptive
management are the design and implementation of ecosystem
monitoring and the iterative process of feeding that
information back into management actions (Garmestani et al.
2009). Natural resource management then evolves from a
system of strict control to a cycle of experimenting,
monitoring, learning, and adapting.  
Although it was initially developed by ecologists, adaptive
management has gradually incorporated elements from policy
and social sciences, resulting in broader application. In
addition to direct monitoring data from the ecosystem of
interest, adaptive management now integrates information
from stakeholders, citizens, and others with local knowledge.
Notably, no one-size-fits-all prescription or blueprint for
adaptive management exists; rather, the development of
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adaptive management strategies is context and scale
dependent. However, there are a few key components which
do provide guidance for an adaptive management strategy: 
1. Baselines are established and models are used to
illuminate potential results of management actions. 
2. Monitoring is essential and must be carefully designed
to measure components that provide indicators of system
health, and to capture components that experience
measurable change on a timescale relevant to informing
management decisions. 
3. Incorporating a variety of knowledge sources into initial
and revised management actions is critical. 
4. Management actions are revisited in light of new
information from system monitoring. 
However, the flexibility inherent in this iterative approach is
at odds with current approaches to environmental and natural
resources law, where certainty is the endgame (Cosens 2012).
Natural resource management often faces even greater
challenges at the international scale where often a single
document, for example, a treaty, controls. During negotiations,
admitting uncertainty may weaken the likelihood of
agreement, and given the difficulties of reaching agreement
in the first instance, adapting treaties to changed circumstances
is incredibly difficult. Many treaties have no sunset clause and
are surprisingly short on governance details, and many ignore
the possibility of circumstances changing (Odom and Wolf
2011). When circumstances change, an older treaty drafted to
govern a river that has changed dramatically may still be the
law of the land.  
Rigidity problems could be overcome through a common
negotiation practice, whereby negotiators outsource
management details by establishing an international agency
to comanage the shared resource. In this instance, we would
suggest manifesting an agreement to collaboratively and
adaptively manage a shared river basin by establishing a
mechanism for international cooperation at the river-basin
scale, bound to operate according to adaptive management
principles. As long as process is emphasized in the treaty,
along with the inclusion of proven treaty mechanisms for
enhanced cooperation, co-riparians may overcome the
challenges of international resource management, while also
fostering social–ecological resilience. Below, we describe key
treaty and governance mechanisms as a framework for
iterative and cooperative transboundary water management,
and then apply this framework in an analysis of the Okavango
River Basin and the organization charged with governing it.
TREATY ELEMENTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE
Conflict among states over shared water resources impedes
collaborative management, and treaty design plays an
important role in minimizing conflict. Here, institutional
resilience is measured by levels of conflict and cooperation in
the basin; it reflects the stability of water management regimes
and not necessarily the ecological resilience of the watershed
(Green and Perrings 2013). The unique socioeconomic and
physical characteristics of each international basin preclude
strict prototypes for building resilient water management
institutions (Ostrom et al. 2007). Thus, each treaty articulates
a distinct composition of governance provisions. Some treaties
establish management regimes that are iterative, where
information is shared and conflicts are avoided. Others plan
for extreme events, monitor continuously, and manage jointly.
Some treaties include many of these provisions, whereas other
treaties address a single issue (e.g., flood control) (Oregon
State University 2013). In essence, treaty design, as opposed
to the mere presence of a treaty, drives the stability of the
institution (Dinar et al. 2010). Although rules for treaty design
do not exist, patterns have emerged that illustrate potential
relationships among particular provisions, institutional
resilience, and adaptive capacity (Dinar et al. 2010, Adger et
al. 2011).  
Such patterns are the result of a systematic, empirical approach
to analyzing treaties and quantifying cooperation conducted
through the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
(TFDD; Oregon State University 2013). The TFDD collection
of over 450 treaties underwent a content analysis for a wide
variety of treaty provisions (Hamner and Wolf 1998, Oregon
State University 2013). Water-related events were collected
as reported in the media and scaled along the Basins at Risk
spectrum for the degree of conflict and cooperation (Yoffe et
al. 2003). Statistical analysis revealed the significance of
particular treaty provisions with respect to conflict among
treaty signatories (Dinar et al. 2010). Below, we discuss the
treaty elements with the most significant statistical
relationship to institutional capacity, as measured by reported
state grievances, and those that are most vital to iterative
governance.
Water allocation method
How states physically share water resources is the most
conflictive issue between riparian neighbors, yet states rarely
delineate water allocations (Giordano and Wolf 2003).
Further, the treaties that do specify allocation quantities most
commonly do so by fixed volumes, ignoring dynamic
hydrology, social values, and human and environmental needs.
Rigid entitlements do not account for hydrologic variability;
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts such
rigidity will lead to increased international tension (McCarthy
et al. 2001). As such, flexibility in the method of water
allocation is a critical signal of institutional resilience to
physical disturbance (Dinar et al. 2010, Odom and Wolf 2011).
Statistically, only allocation by percentage of flow, which
inherently reflects availability, reduces the intensity of conflict
and facilitates collaborative management between riparian
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states. The lack of an allocation mechanism, inclusion of fixed
allocations, and the allocation of entire rivers elicit more
intense complaints between states (Dinar et al. 2010).  
However, it should be noted that allocation by percentage of
flow, although positive for institutional resilience, may not be
sufficient for ecological resilience (Green and Perrings 2013).
Allocation by percentage accounts for changes in availability,
but it may still lead to dewatering if, for example, a bilateral
agreement allocates 50% of flow to each state and both states
utilize their entire allotment for diversionary uses. Without
protection for instream flows and the needs of aquatic
ecosystems, collaborative institutions may degrade the
environment. Moreover, a degraded environment will likely
lead to future conflict as resources become increasingly scarce.
Some institutions address this issue by complex allocation
schemes that vary by flow level. The resilience of such
schemes depends on the ability to agree on flow level, accuracy
in modeling yield and variability, adjustments accounting for
varied availability, and the amount of flow left unallocated
(instream) (Kilgour and Dinar 2001).
Extreme events provision
Institutional and ecological resilience are defined as the
capacity to cope with change (Yoffe et al. 2003), and yet
transboundary water treaties regularly ignore the inevitability
of extreme events. This is disturbing in light of recent research
demonstrating that the intensity of state grievances is robustly
correlated with the degree of flow variability in the basin, and
that the presence of drought-adaptation provisions affects the
intensity of complaints (Dinar et al. 2010). In addition,
transboundary floods account for a disproportionate share of
causalities and increased magnitude of loss (Bakker 2009).  
Extreme fluctuations in flow can be addressed through an
allocation mechanism, in separate provisions, or through
single-issue treaties. Flood protection is commonly addressed
in single-issue treaties, mostly as detailed agreements on joint
infrastructure. Drought is rarely addressed in any detail. And,
even when reduced water availability is addressed in the
allocation scheme, ecosystem and biodiversity protections
during drought are extremely rare (Giordano 2003).
Joint monitoring and information exchange
Continuous, systematic monitoring and data sharing are
crucial for iterative governance of a dynamic resource
(Garmestani et al. 2009, Cosens 2012). Monitoring is also an
important aspect of water allocation and enforcement, and
joint monitoring agreements can be the first cooperative step
between states. In fact, joint monitoring correlates to fewer
state grievances in water allocation and hydropower treaties
(Dinar et al. 2010). When ecosystem knowledge is shared
between parties, international resource managers can be
responsive and flexible at the appropriate scale (Brown 2002),
and can immediately focus resources on a problem rather than
first negotiate over which data to use (Cosens 2003). To
overcome tendencies to “hunker down” whereby states are
less willing to share information when facing disturbance, the
agreement to share data must be institutionalized through a
treaty (Anderies et al. 2004, Putnam 2007).  
Unfortunately, although many treaties include monitoring and
data-sharing provisions, information sharing among states is
relatively low (Grossman 2006). In many basins, monitoring
inadequacy can be attributed to a lack of technological
resources. Even where tributaries are frequently monitored
and data is shared, incompatibility between datasets often
hinders effective utilization of the data. Whatever the cause,
weak data exchange impedes collaborative governance and
exacerbates ecosystem harm from hydraulic infrastructure
(Grossman 2006).
Enforcement
Enforcement reduces the intensity of complaints between
states (Dinar et al. 2010) and can be structured either as
imposition of punishment on defectors or as integrated benefit
sharing, side payment, or issue linkage that so strongly
incentivizes compliance that the agreement is self enforcing.
Enforcement increases the likelihood of compliance, generally
includes means for detecting noncompliance and thus
providing transparency, and reduces the possibility of tying
diplomatic actions against a noncompliant party to unrelated
issues. Enforcement makes the agreement more robust and
stable but must be coupled with monitoring to be effective
(Keohane and Martin 1995). Self enforcement by way of
benefit sharing occurs when multiple water-related goods are
linked in the agreement such that defection by a party would
lead to loss by that same party; thus, the benefits of defection
are reduced and the incentives to cooperate are strengthened
(Sadoff and Grey 2002, Wu and Whittington 2006).
Dispute resolution mechanisms
Previously agreed-upon methods of dispute resolution act as
a failsafe against defection and provide states with a minimal
incentive to cooperate. This mechanism also provides states
with assurance that their concerns will be aired in an amicable
environment. It also provides an additional means for
adaptation in the face of uncertainty by providing a mechanism
to resolve disputes over issues not anticipated during treaty
negotiation (Cosens 2003). Dispute resolution mechanisms
have been shown to reduce the intensity of state grievances
(Dinar et al. 2010), but the degree of influence dispute
resolution has over institutional and ecological resilience
varies by basin and form. Disputes may be resolved by
consultation, arbitration through neutral third party (e.g.,
International Court of Arbitration), diplomatic channels, or
joint commission, among other means.
Joint management
In response to the diplomatic restraints of the negotiation
process, states often establish joint commissions to manage
shared waters. These agencies are typically composed of
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several technocrats from each state along with an equal number
of representatives from each party and are directed to establish
water management plans, develop collaborative projects,
monitor water levels and use, resolve conflicts, gather and
disseminate data, build local capacity, and engage the public,
among other duties. Joint commissions charged with
addressing multiple collective action problems, such as water
allocation and environmental conservation, face complex
obstacles to their effectiveness, but many argue that
integration of all related problems is required for efficacy,
especially in addressing feedback (Kliot et al. 2001,
Dombrowsky 2007, Sadoff et al. 2008). Others argue that a
singular focus on optimizing for a particular outcome fails to
retain the full range of ecosystem services (Walker and Salt
2006, Zellmer and Gunderson 2009). If addressing multiple
issues reduces the effectiveness of an organization but a
singular focus leads to exacerbation of related problems, a
balance must be struck whereby the most crucial related
problems, such as sanitation and ecosystem resilience, are
addressed alongside resource distribution (Schmeier 2010,
Cosens and Stow 2013). After all, an organization that focuses
solely on how to allocate water on the front end and has no
jurisdiction to mitigate or even monitor withdrawals will only
be effective until the river runs dry.
Iterative processes for adaptive management
There are no water treaties that explicitly spell out adaptive
management principles; thus, the effect of these principles on
institutional resilience cannot currently be calculated.
However, the process of iterative governance is widely
heralded as the most appropriate management technique for
promoting ecological resilience (Cosens 2010, 2012, Eckstein
2010). As discussed above, the difficulty of negotiations tends
to result in relatively brief documents that leave much of the
operational tedium to be worked out by technocrats. Given the
need for continuous learning and adaptation and the difficulty
of renegotiation, mandating explicit management techniques
(e.g., use X amount of water for Y purpose until Z occurs) in
a treaty would not be the most effective method of instilling
iterative processes into transboundary water management.
Instead, we propose establishing a mechanism for
collaboration at the basin scale that binds participants to
govern collaboratively and iteratively (e.g., joint
commission). Key principles for guiding the governance of
that basin collaboration are discussed in the next section,
followed by an in-depth analysis of one transboundary river
basin organization that exemplifies the application of many of
these principles.
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES THAT
FOSTER RESILIENT SOCIAL–ECOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS
Governance that recognizes linkages between social and
ecological systems enhances resilience by utilizing the natural
adaptive capabilities of the ecological system and the social
system’s ability to respond to ecological problems (Cosens
2010, 2012). First, to understand the relation between
governance and adaptive management, we will rely on the
following definition in which “governance is the process of
resolving trade-offs and of providing a vision and direction
for sustainability, management is the operationalization of this
vision...” (Boyle et al. 2001). Adaptive governance requires
integration of multiple levels of action—government,
nongovernmental, and individual—and among agencies
within the same level of government with overlapping
authority (Folke et al. 2005). Adaptive governance moves
from a focus on efficiency and optimization to a focus on
jurisdictional diversity, redundancy, and multiple levels of
management that include a role for local knowledge and local
action (Cosens and Williams 2012, Cosens 2012). 
Governance needed to foster ecosystem resilience requires
flexibility to adapt but will be rejected by societies if it
disregards the effect on the social system itself, thus local input
is necessary. Delegation of increased flexibility for adaptive
management from sovereign nations to international
commissions must assure that increased flexibility is exercised
in a legitimate manner that is responsive to the social system
(Cosens 2012). The key is operating through a process that is
accurately scaled, well informed, open to the public,
influenced by local stakeholders, and adaptable to change
(Cosens 2012). The following principles are necessary to
account for scale and crucial to maintaining legitimacy: each
level of control must communicate and coordinate, engage the
public while building the public’s capacity to participate, and
have authority to act to address issues as they arise.
Multiple, overlapping levels of control and horizontal
and vertical flow of information and coordination
Complex systems rarely have clearly identifiable scales for
governance (Ruhl and Salzman 2010). Although coordination
may be needed across an entire ecosystem, issues that arise do
not always require action at such a large scale (Ruhl and
Salzman 2010, Cosens et al. 2012). In response, resilience
thinking rejects the call for a single, efficient level of
management and instead calls for multiple overlapping
authorities (Cosens 2010, Cosens 2012). This approach allows
response across different scales depending on the source and
impacts of the problem. Further, nested scales of management
authority enable adaptation and innovation at smaller scales
while providing large scale stability. In addition to including
multiple levels of governance and nongovernmental local
action, resilience thinking assures that coordination must at
least occur at the scale of the social–ecological system
involved but must include linkage to multiple scales of
governance to allow adaptive response. These linkages among
nested scales are of particular importance when there is a
difference between the scale of the problem source and the
scale of the required solution (Long 2009). Thus coordination
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of various levels of governance through basin-scale
collaboration or a formal commission is essential for
addressing problems that manifest at that scale (Long 2009). 
Information sharing also is crucial to reducing uncertainty
when problems occur, especially when caused at multiple
scales and from diverse sources. In a system of nested
jurisdiction, information must flow freely from the bottom,
that is, those experiencing the problem firsthand, to the
uppermost appropriate jurisdiction, that is, those holding the
resources required to solve the problem or those that
coordinate action and vice versa. This is especially true given
that uncertainty, such as with the ecological response to
climate change, can never be reduced to zero. Higher levels
of governance must be informed by the facts on the ground.
Instead of funneling information down, data must be shared
up and down and across jurisdictions for a coordinated
problem-solving approach (Cosens 2010).
Meaningful public participation and local capacity
building
Accountability concerns may be addressed by procedural
controls on the actors and citizen checks via public
participation and local capacity building. Vertical and
horizontal information sharing is incomplete if local
knowledge does not enter the flow. Meaningful public
participation refers to a two-way flow of information in which
governmental agencies provide information from their own
expertise, incorporate local knowledge, and empower a greater
role for public input in decision making (McKinney and
Harmon 2004). To be meaningful, public participation
requires that the exchange of information and input occurs at
a time and place convenient to local citizen volunteers.
Gathering local input may involve attendance by agency
personnel at regularly scheduled community meetings, rather
than holding separate meetings (Cosens 2003). For a long-
term, complex process, it may also require funding for the
participation of local leaders who generally lack the resources
to participate. Resources at the local level are required and, in
many circumstances, capacity building can better prepare the
local response to an ecological problem. Finally, meaningful
public participation results in public input carrying enough
weight to influence the final decision; adaptive governance
requires more than a mere opportunity for public comment.
Authority to respond to changed circumstances across a
range of scenarios
The final step in designing an adaptive structure of governance
is to ensure that the actor at the appropriate scale, acting with
information from all levels of jurisdiction, including an
informed and active public, has authority to address whatever
problem continuous monitoring reveals. Otherwise, the
system is well informed but impotent. Ecological problems
are typically of the “wicked” variety—where actors cannot
agree on the definition of the problem, much less the solution
—and the uncertainty of any given response cannot be
eliminated. Uncertainty cannot be an excuse for inaction but
should instead be the catalyst for iterative action. When
continuous system monitoring reveals an ecological problem,
decision making and action should occur at the appropriate
scale , which is not necessarily at the basin or international
level, while accountability is maintained through a political
or peer-selection process (Cosens 2010).
THE OKAVANGO RIVER BASIN: RESILIENCE
ELEMENTS APPLIED
Globally, water-related conflict increases with water
variability (Dinar et al. 2010). Arid and semi-arid basins
experience significantly more intense conflict and relatively
few cooperative events categorized as “slightly cooperative.”
Interestingly, arid regions are also more likely to engage in
highly cooperative behavior, such as collaborative
management and international agreement (i.e., treaties). Thus,
just as conflict increases with extremes in water availability,
high levels of cooperation are also more likely in basins that
experience extreme climatic variability. Whether basin states
conflict or cooperate in times of extremes depends on their
institutional capacity to absorb the extreme event (Wolf et al.
2003). Shared by Angola, Botswana, and Namibia in
southwestern Africa (see Fig. 1), the Okavango River Basin
provides an interesting case study of the capacity of states to
implement some of the components of adaptive governance
and in particular to collaboratively manage a volatile and vital
resource where uncertainty runs high.
Fig. 1. Map of the Okavango River Basin.
Ecology and Society 18(2): 23
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss2/art23/
Table 1. Summary of elements.
A. Treaty mechanisms and their status in the Okavango treaties.
B. Adaptive governance principles and their status in the Okavango governance structure.
 
A. Treaty Mechanisms In treaty? Status
Water allocation method No Unresolved, ongoing preparation
Extreme events provision Yes Proactive planning approach, including authority to respond
Joint monitoring and information exchange Yes Ongoing and improving
Enforcement No Integrated approach but trade-offs yet to be delineated
Dispute resolution mechanism Yes OKACOM charged with conflict prevention and resolution;
consensus; negotiation
Joint management Yes OKACOM
Iterative processes for adaptive management No Not explicit in treaty but may be in governance framework
B. Adaptive governance principles In governance
framework?
Status
Overlapping levels of control Yes Stakeholders at multiple scales have input
Horizontal and vertical information flow Yes Robust data sharing
Meaningful public participation Yes Advanced participation methods
Local capacity building Yes Local contractors prioritized; collaboration with local stakeholders
Authority to respond Unknown Not yet tested
 
The natural state of the Okavango is one of extremes,
characterized by high water in the wet season and severe aridity
in the dry season. Ninety-five percent of flow originates in the
headwaters with environmentally dependent ecotourism
economies downstream. Decades of civil war have impeded
development and collaboration. Yet, the region experiences
very little conflict over water; conflict did not even arise in
the 1980s and 1990s during prolonged periods of severe
drought when average flows shrank by 14—45% (McCarthy
et al. 2000). With the aid of international donors, a robust river-
basin organization has emerged with a focus on ambitious data
collection, collaborative governance, local empowerment, and
environmental stewardship in a relatively pristine ecosystem
(Mbaiwa 2004). 
However, the institutional capacity of the Okavango, although
strong, may face increased pressure if climate-change models
predicting increased water variability play out. Quantitative
studies indicate that increased water variability caused by
global warming could challenge even resilient governance
regimes (Dinar et al. 2010). After all, the “likelihood and
intensity of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin
exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb that change”
(Yoffe et al. 2004). Thus, the analysis below applies the two
frameworks outlined in the previous sections—a framework
for institutionally resilient treaties and a framework for
adaptive governance—to assess the present and future
capacities of the Okavango’s riparian states to adapt to change
(see summary in Table 1). This section is meant to provide
examples of framework application, rather than providing a
comprehensive analysis of the adaptive capacity of the basin.
Hydrology of the Okavango River Basin
The Okavango River Basin of southwest Africa provides vital
water resources to an otherwise arid region. The basin is
located in a transition zone between high and low rainfall areas
and is fed by a single wet season, resulting in high flow
variability between seasons—between -45% and +65% of
mean annual flow (Ashton and Neal 2003). Annual floodwater
drains into the Okavango Delta, which is the second-largest
inland delta in the world. It is also an internationally
recognized ecoregion, designated a Wetland of International
Importance by the Ramsar Convention in 1996 and identified
as a priority ecoregion by the World Wildlife Fund Global 200 
project (Olson and Dinerstein 2002). The rich biodiversity of
the area attracts ecotourism, a top economic driver in
downstream Botswana (Kgathi et al. 2006). The Okavango is
one of the least developed and largest basins in Africa, but the
socioeconomic needs of the growing population are forecasted
to spur increased development, especially for irrigation
(Andersson et al. 2003, Hughes et al. 2011). 
The few diversions from the Okavango serve domestic and
relatively small irrigation needs. Supporting rich biodiversity
and economic interests of the delta region, flow into the
wetlands represents the largest water use in the basin (Ashton
2003). Angola, the farthest upstream riparian state, receives
nearly four times the precipitation of the lowland southern
states of Botswana and Namibia and contributes almost 95%
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of the annual delta inflow (Andersson et al. 2003, Ashton
2003). Decades of civil war in Angola prevented hydraulic
development, and now that the nation enjoys peace,
development pressures are expected to intensify (Hughes et
al. 2011). For these reasons, international efforts have focused
on increasing the local capacity and data-gathering systems in
Angola. 
The most likely development scenarios, which include
construction of one hydropower dam, formal irrigation
schemes, population growth, and deforestation, project limited
impact on annual flow, but the models consider each element
individually and not as a comprehensive development scheme.
For example, potential formal irrigation schemes are projected
to decrease annual flow by 2% and minimum monthly flow
by 5%, while deforestation would increase flow by 2.5%
(Andersson et al. 2006, Murray-Hudson et al. 2006, Milzow
et al. 2010). 
Additionally, various climate change models project a long-
term (2050–2080) decrease in annual mean water flow of
14%–20% and a change in the timing of peak discharge by
one month, whereas other models estimate dramatically
increased flow in the near future (2020–2050; Andersson et
al. 2006). A review of many projections reveals a lack of
consensus on the sign or magnitude of change, yet concludes
that there is a high probability of large changes in water
availability in the basin, and especially the delta (Murray-
Hudson et al. 2006, Hughes et al. 2011).  
Given the uncertainty and variability of climate change
models, the basin states should take a cautious and iterative
approach to development (Ellery and McCarthy 1994,
Andersson et al. 2003). The Basins at Risk project identified
the basin as having the potential for conflict in the near future
(Yoffe et al. 2003). To manage this pressure and facilitate
sustainable development, the three riparian states and the
international community have heavily invested in
collaborative and integrated management of the basin through
multiple international agreements and institutional and local
capacity building projects (Mbaiwa 2004).
Okavango treaties and agreements
Several agreements lay out governance of the Okavango. First,
the 1994 Agreement between the Governments of the Republic
of Angola, the Republic of Botswana, and the Republic of
Namibia on the Establishment of a Permanent Okavango River
Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) established this body
as a technical advisor to all three countries on issues relating
to conservation, utilization, and development (OKACOM
1994). Thirteen years later, the Agreement Between the
Governments of the Republic of Angola, the Republic of
Botswana and the Republic of Namibia on the Organizational
Structure of OKACOM came into force, which establishes
three branches of OKACOM: the Secretariat for
administrative and financial matters, the Steering Committee 
for technical advice, by way of three task forces—
hydrological, biodiversity, institutional; and the Commission 
itself which supervises and sets policy objectives (OKACOM
2007). For purposes of content analysis for particular treaty
mechanisms, the entire record of 11 agreements signed over
a span of 16 years is reviewed and discussed as a whole. 
Article 4 of the 1994 treaty establishing OKACOM sets out
its function as an advisor on issues such as: 
1. Determining the long term safe yield of water 
2. Reasonable levels of demand 
3. Criteria for conservation, equitable allocation, and
sustainable utilization 
4. Investigations into development, either jointly or by
individual states 
5. Pollution prevention and aquatic weed control 
6. Short-term drought measures (1994). 
The agreement concerning the organizational structure of
OKACOM elaborated on these functions, detailing
OKACOM’s duty to prepare a draft allocation agreement and
technical, economic, financial, and legal information in
support of a Master Plan for integrating water use in the basin.
The Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of
a Secretariat (OKASEC) for the Commission details
secretarial functions relating to information sharing and
communication to include development of an information
strategy using existing sources of data and to provide
institutional memory (OKACOM 2005).
Water allocation method
Instead of establishing an allocation regime by treaty, the 2006
agreement concerning the organizational structure of
OKACOM charged the Commission with drafting the
Agreement on Shared Water Resources of the Basin. The only
guidance contained in a treaty is found in the original 1994
treaty that gave responsibility to OKACOM to prepare
“equitable allocation” (1994). To date, no allocation scheme
has been established as states are still in the preparation stage
—evaluating demand and supply, structuring water laws, and
forming councils (OKACOM 2010a).  
Water needs in the basin have largely focused on population
growth projections and current land-use patterns.
Consumptive water needs are estimated at 23.2 million cubic
meters annually for the entire basin, or about 0.23% of the
annual flow into the delta (Ashton 2003). Projections of
increased demand for the year 2020 range from 0.33% to 3.0%
of mean annual flow. The worst-case scenario demand
projections amount to only a 3.0% increase in water use, a sum
that may seem insignificant considering the degree of natural
variability in the basin. Likewise, many climate change
scenarios do not exceed the standard deviation of historical
Ecology and Society 18(2): 23
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss2/art23/
flows (Hughes et al. 2011). Given the dramatic variability in
the natural system, the Okavango displays high levels of
resilience to flow variability (Hughes et al. 2011). However,
sustained increases in use may pose unforeseeable
consequences on the basin, especially on margins of the delta
that no longer receive annual floodwaters (Murray-Hudson et
al. 2006).  
Environmental flow assessments have been conducted with
various disciplinary focuses (e.g., geomorphology, socioeconomics,
hydrology) as part of the Cubango-Okavango River Basin
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (OKAKOM 2011). They
conclude that the largest user of water comes from the
environmental demands of the delta, and that development
decisions must first consider environmental impacts of any
project both upstream and downstream. At this time when
development is low and environmental need is high,
OKACOM should capitalize on the lack of competition over
uses and allocate adequate environmental flow in the
allocation scheme (Quesne et al. 2010). 
Because the stability granted by a formal allocation scheme is
likely to spur development, any agreement on allocations must
consider the potential impacts with respect to decadal periods
of low flow and minimal environmental flow (Hughes et al.
2011). Likewise, hydraulic development may impede critical
sediment transport and reduce channel shifting that is critical
to biodiversity and fertility (Kgathi et al. 2006). Coupled with
climate change-induced reductions in precipitation, it is vital
that basin states work collaboratively on development
decisions and to continuously monitor the environmental
impacts of water use.
Extreme events
Very familiar with extreme hydrological events, the states of
the Okavango have taken a proactive approach to dealing with
drought and flooding, most notably by developing an advance
warning system. The 2010 Protocol on Hydrological Data
Sharing for the Okavango River Basin states that: “The
[Hydrological Task Force] shall provide OKASEC [the
Secretariat] with the best available information on floods,
droughts and pollution magnitudes at different time and space
scales. OKASEC shall channel the information to decision
making bodies and other public actors in the three member
Countries” (OKACOM 2010b). Article 4.6 of the 1994 treaty
addresses drought concerns by granting OKACOM authority
to advise any state on measures to “alleviate short term
difficulties resulting from water shortages...during periods of
drought.” When advising, OKACOM should consider stored
water availability and the “water requirement” of each state
(OKACOM 1994). 
To better adapt to inevitable change, the states collaborate on
the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis to establish baseline
flows, water-quality levels, etc. (OKACOM 2011). This
analysis, along with Andersson et al. (2006), Hughes et al.
(2011), and others assessed the hydrology, climate, and social
dynamics of the basin to run models of potential impacts of
development, land-use change, and climate change. Although
they were mostly inconclusive because of the difficulties of
modeling multiple changes in a dynamic system, they were
successful in identifying data-collection problems, most
notably the lack of data in Angola where 95% of flow
originates.
Monitoring
Overall, hydrometric data in the region is sparse but improving
(Kgathi et al. 2006, Hughes et al. 2011). A separate protocol
exists for sharing hydrological data in the basin (OKACOM
2010b); the Steering Committee is charged with responsibility
for the protocol, and the Hydrology Task Force implements
the protocol. A short-term function of the Secretariat is to
monitor and report quarterly on progress in implementing
decisions, and a longer-term function is coordination of data
collection and documentation. The Secretariat is charged with
creating a plan of action for monitoring implementation of
OKACOM agreements.  
After each hydrological year, states have three months to
provide a hydrological report to be distributed through the
Secretariat, as per the 2010 protocol. Each state is responsible
for its own hydrometerological monitoring stations which
should monitor water level, water discharge, water quality,
sediment transport, and meteorological data. Water-level
measurements taken at key locations are to be recorded and
shared daily. Water discharge and quality measurements are
shared quarterly. Certain water-quality parameters are to be
prioritized: electrical conductivity, total dissolved solids,
dissolved oxygen, pH, phosphates, nitrates, fecal coliforms,
total hardness, temperature, turbidity, total suspended solids,
and chlorophyll A. States share data with the Hydrological
Task Force, and the Secretariat shares the data with decision-
making bodies in the states. In addition, Article XIV binds
each state to report data on floods, droughts, and pollution
levels to the Hydrological Task Force to enable OKACOM to
establish and operate the early warning information system.
This level of monitoring detail is rare in international
agreements and bodes well for the basin states’ capacity to
collaborate and adapt.
Enforcement
Traditional methods of enforcement, such as side payments,
are not included in the collection of Okavango treaties. Instead,
the parties have taken an integrated approach to managing the
river basin. Issue integration functions as enforcement to the
degree that defection, presumably for gain, on one issue
correspondingly leads to loss on another. There are no
delineated trade-offs because the issues are still in the
assessment phase. However, OKACOM has taken strides to
curb defection and corruption of process. For example, state
representatives must disclose all potential conflicts of
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interests, and OKACOM is charged with approving
accountability mechanisms and documentation (OKACOM
2006). Additionally, OKACOM may “institute any form of
legal proceedings to protect the water resources of the Basin”
(OKACOM 2006). This stick has yet to be tested or applied,
so it is unclear if OKACOM might use this provision to initiate
legal proceedings against a party whose action allegedly
conflicts with OKACOM’s conservation and protection
mission. 
Outside bodies and overlapping levels of governance play an
enforcement role as well, especially donors. For example, the
2009 Agreement between Sweden and OKACOM on Support
to the OKACOM Secretariat through the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
includes auditing clauses and entitles Sida to withhold
disbursement of funds if OKACOM deviates from their plan.
Additionally, OKACOM agreed to prevent corruption and
take “rapid legal measures” to stop it and punish it (OKACOM
2004). Outside of direct contracts, external forces such as the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) may
exert enough influence to dissuade a party from defecting
through measures like international sanctions or tense
relations.
Dispute resolution mechanism
Article VII of the original 1994 treaty that established
OKACOM vaguely provides that any disagreement “shall be
settled by the Contracting Parties,” but does not provide any
detail about the process (OKACOM 2004). Later agreements
spell out the decision-making process should the parties not
reach consensus. OKACOM is charged with conflict
prevention and resolution through consideration of any and
all claims and complaints and instituting legal proceedings
(OKACOM 2006). OKACOM has the liberty to define the
process for dispute resolution (OKACOM 2006). If no
consensus is reached after several attempts, “the matter shall
be made the subject for negotiations between the parties”
(OKACOM 2010c).  
Additionally, the Secretariat is charged with “conflict
prevention” (OKACOM 2005). The Secretariat may do this
by monitoring activities in the basin and informing OKACOM
of potential conflicts, dispute resolution if instructed by
OKACOM, and serving as impartial broker in negotiations to
reach consensus in OKACOM. All of these mechanisms are
internal and not necessarily subject to neutral review, except
that OKACOM is heavily partnered with international aid
organizations that would likely withhold financial support
should a conflict impede the mission of OKACOM. But the
international pressure and related financial incentives are only
temporary, and OKACOM will soon be financially
independent. The inability to settle a dispute could impede
adaptive decision making in the face of disturbance (Schmeier
and Schulze 2012).
Adaptive governance framework
Multiple, overlapping levels of governance
At this seminal stage of developing a governance structure,
actors at every level have input in the Okavango. International
aid and development organizations, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), World
Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Sida, partner with regional players
such as OKACOM and SADC, and many national agencies
and nonprofits in each state, while strengthening avenues for
local input.  
Local scale. Considerable success has been made toward
sustainable resource management by empowering local
custodians. Local stakeholders have a voice in governing the
Okavango through the Every River has its People Project,
among other programs. The project gathers information from
and facilitates information exchange among the many peoples
of the Okavango. The aim is to empower local voices through
educating OKACOM members about the problems facing
local communities and developing joint solutions. In addition,
local stakeholders take ownership of sustainable management
through increased property rights. Through collective action,
communities acquire conservancies or trusts to manage the
resource. Additionally, the Basin Wide Forum consists of 10
local community representatives from each state and provides
a forum for communication and knowledge exchange (ARD,
Inc. 2009).  
Nation scale. Each state provides constitutional protection for
the environment and has a water ministry responsible for
coordinating development. In Namibia, the Department of
Water Affairs is charged with water resource management and
coordinates the acts of other departments that may have an
impact on water resources (Ashton and Neal 2003). Duties
include monitoring, data sharing, and education. Thus,
although multiple agencies may have authority over acts
relating to water resources, one department acts as the stop-
gap custodian and coordinator of all water-related activities.
Additionally, environmental flows must be accounted for in
any water allocation scheme according to Namibian law. In
Botswana, the Department of Water Affairs functions
similarly to the Nambian counterpart by serving as a
coordinating body for all water-related projects and custodian
for water resources. In addition, Botswana has a regularly
updated National Water Master Plan with which all projects
that may impact or degrade water resources must comply. This
results in a high level of collaboration among ministries and
integrated national planning. Angola takes a decentralized
approach to water governance by granting authority to
provincial governments under the Water Law (Lei de Aqua,
Law No. 6/02) and Water Sector Development Strategy
(Ashton and Neal 2003). 
Watershed scale. Most of this case study focuses on
governance at the watershed scale through OKACOM, as the
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coordinator of authority over the Okavango. In addition to
OKACOM’s previously described governance innovations, a
transboundary land-use plan is in preparation and will likely
be adopted (ARD, Inc. 2009). OKACOM and partners have
identified transboundary land-use planning as a priority to
address often-conflicting land uses such as agriculture and
wildlife tourism (i.e., migration interference) and completed
a consultative land-use planning process (ARD, Inc. 2009). 
Region scale. The SADC Revised Protocol on Shared
Watercourses (2000), developed for the governance of basins
in southern Africa, promotes collaboration between riparian
states that protects sovereignty, the environment, and human
rights. The Revised Protocol urges states to strike a sustainable
balance between development of water resources for human
needs and conservation and environmental enhancement. The
Revised Protocol is not prescriptive and is generally a
statement of guiding principles. As members, states pledge
cooperation on socioeconomic, political, and security issues.
All three Okavango riparian states are members of the SADC,
but only Botswana and Namibia have ratified the Revised
Protocol.  
Other international aid organizations play a vital role in
OKACOM’s operations. The Integrated River Basin
Management Project (IRBM), funded by USAID and SADC,
developed OKACOM’s institutional capacity by establishing
the permanent Secretariat (OKASEC). Whereas IRBM took
a demand-driven approach, the dependence of OKACOM on
foreign aid both financially and operationally may signal a
weakness in its authority to adapt. However, access to
international expertise has also led to vast improvements in
OKACOM, especially in terms of information flow, public
participation, and local capacity building, and international
aid is structured to decrease as OKACOM member states
increase financial support (Ard, Inc. 2009).
Horizontal and vertical flow of information
The effort to increase data sharing is robust and ambitious in
the Okavango Basin, especially considering the restraints of
collecting historic data and the lack of monitoring stations.
Through the IRBM project, great emphasis has been placed
on increasing monitoring stations and building a meta-
database of all regional databases to be operated and
maintained by the Secretariat. Beyond hydrometric data,
IRBM’s demand-driven approach to developing programs in
the Okavango required international aid agencies to listen to
the needs of OKACOM and local stakeholders. Strategic
planning workshops were held early on to gather inputs,
priorities, and recommendations from stakeholders. The
demands of the stakeholders were then incorporated into
project strategies and work plans. 
A collaboration to increase information flow resulted in an
inventory of available tools and an assessment of the need for
new tools. Based on this, hydrometric monitoring stations
were installed with a special emphasis on Angola where
monitoring data was poor; a data hub called Sharing Water 
was established to identify and link various databases; training
was provided to OKACOM on the use and maintenance of
meta-databases; and guidelines were developed for uniform
data collection, reporting, and monitoring methods. Likewise,
the collaboration conducted environmental assessments of
ecologically sensitive areas and recommended actions for the
conservation of priority sites of significant biodiversity or
areas that require better management to protect the watershed.
 
This data formed the basis of the Okavango Delta Management
Plan (ODMP) and the Okavango Delta Information System 
(ODIS), which contain GIS data layers for land use, wildlife,
demographics, etc. and is maintained by the Harry
Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre (HOORC) at the
University of Botswana. The Every River has its People
Project funded research on the basin, and the resulting data
have also been cataloged at HOORC. Another project
combines these data sources and other information being
collected for the transboundary diagnostic assessment to
prepare the framework for the Okavango Basin Information
System (OBIS). One success of the Transboundary Diagnostic
Analysis is the standardization of data collection to enable the
compatibility of each state’s datasets (Schmeier and Schulze
2012). Getting each basin state to communicate in the same
technical language is the first step in establishing a flow of
information.
Meaningful public participation and local capacity building
Public participation in the Okavango is not limited to
opportunities to comment on proposals drafted by authorities.
OKACOM members and other key stakeholders have been
trained in Advanced Participation Methods, a proven
facilitation technique for rapid coordination of community
action planning. These methods assist communities in
developing collective visions and concrete action plans.
Facilitators conduct workshops in communities to identify
community project priorities, give the public a voice in
describing current problems and success, assemble work
teams, and prepare work plans to implement projects. The goal
is to ensure public participation in all decisions and to
distribute responsibility so that work teams take ownership of
local projects. 
To ensure that public participation is meaningful, OKACOM
has put considerable effort into increasing the capacity of local
communities to sustainably manage the resource. To support
local partners and foster local capacity, OKACOM endorses
a policy of procuring services from local contractors before
looking for regional or international organizations. The IRBM
project established community-based resource centers to
demonstrate community-based water and natural resources
management approaches, facilitate successful grant
Ecology and Society 18(2): 23
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss2/art23/
application through a community small grants program, and
remove policy and regulatory barriers to community
involvement. Local partners are encouraged to collaborate in
project implementation, and the US Forest Service trained
regional technical staff for vegetation and forest inventory,
and Namibian foresters in fire management. The IRBM
process provided additional training in water monitoring, data
management, vegetation and mammal inventories, aerial
survey design, facilitation of meetings, workshops, and
community action programs, rapid appraisal techniques for
conducting socioeconomic and biophysical assessments, grant
and project proposal writing, NGO fiscal management,
conservation agriculture, community-based conservation and
tourism management, HIV/AIDS awareness, sanitation and
public health, and strategic planning.
Authority to adapt
As mentioned previously, basin states are bound to gather and
share data related to floods, drought, and pollution as per a
particular protocol with OKACOM. In turn, the Hydrological
Task Force shares the data with member states to facilitate
early warning systems (OKACOM 2010b). Obviously, this
system is key to adaptation because an institution must be
aware of a changed circumstance before adapting to it.
However, this is only a first step.  
OKACOM’s authority to adapt has not been tested since the
end of the civil war in Angola, but great strides have been
made to prepare for foreseeable challenges. Given that it is
required to act by consensus, OKACOM’s attempts at joint
projects failed to move forward while war waged in Angola
(Schmeier and Schulze 2012). Since peace has been
established, successful joint projects have been carried out,
largely with the aid of foreign agencies. Such projects have
been proactive and focused on information gathering and
sharing, local capacity building, integrated planning, etc.  
An instance where the Commission faced environmental or
social disturbance where adaptation was necessary has yet to
play out. From the legal documents, OKACOM has the
authority to take measures, such as the modification of water
allocations, should the system experience a natural
disturbance. The broad functional scope of OKACOM
includes authority over basin-wide land-use planning,
environmental conservation, joint development, and pollution
prevention.
CONCLUSION
OKACOM is in a unique position for protecting the resources
of the Okavango; there is relatively little development, so
demand for consumptive use is low. This low level of
competition among users gives OKACOM room to allocate
flow for environmental purposes. Further, the largest use is
already an environmental use, that is, flow into the delta to
support biodiversity. Given this, reaching consensus on
protecting that instream flow may not be an insurmountable
challenge, considering that any development decisions must
first consider environmental impacts upstream and
downstream of any project per the Transboundary Diagnostic
Analysis. At this time, when development is low and
environmental need is high, OKACOM should capitalize on
the lack of competition over uses, and ensure adequate
environmental flow in the allocation scheme. Beyond
ecological reasons, there are strong financial incentives to
protect environmental flows as ecotourism booms in the delta.
Ecotourism profit sharing between Botswana and upstream
states may provide a self-enforcing incentive to protect
instream flows and water quality upstream. Through economic
integration, the states of the Okavango would have much to
lose if they fail to protect their ecosystem, and large potential
gains if the region maintains its pristine nature.  
However, to ensure adaptive capacity, natural resource
management must be broader than the river, especially
considering the importance of sedimentation processes in
feeding floodplains and the delta ecosystem (Soils and
Simmonds 2009). Biodiversity must be protected as well,
especially as development increases. Transboundary land-use
planning, if done with species protection in mind, could be a
good approach. In the planning process, managers should take
heed of migration routes, habitat needs, and food-chain
dynamics of all species. OKACOM is currently partnering
with the Wilderness Wildlife Trust to conduct a baseline
analysis of aquatic invertebrates in key sub-basins. A
biomonitoring index was developed during past projects, and
should be integrated into the robust monitoring protocol
established by treaty, which already includes vegetation
monitoring. OKACOM’s Biodiversity Task Force plays a vital
role in coordinating the objectives of water resource
management with the demands of the broader ecosystem, but
is in its seminal stage of program development, including the
integration of transboundary fisheries management.  
Overall, governance of the Okavango River Basin exhibits
many important aspects of adaptability and collaboration (see
summary in Table 1). OKACOM provides a concrete example
of transboundary collaboration to promote ecological and
social health. OKACOM’s inclusivity and consensus model
bode well for both the institutional and ecological resilience
of the basin. With all riparian states on board, any development
project must be approved by all states. Should Angola take
steps to develop hydropower upstream, or Namibia move
forward with a pipeline project to export water to drier areas,
Botswana could force consideration of downstream
environmental consequences before approving such projects.
By addressing potential environmental consequences in
advance, mitigation or compensation measures may be added
to the project, and conflict potential is reduced. Consensus, in
the short term, may lead to conflict while the states negotiate
terms of a project, but in the long term, absence of approval
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of a detrimental upstream project would lead to greater
conflict. Although many challenges still face this relatively
young organization, by committing to a data-driven approach
to decision making that emphasizes community ownership and
empowerment, OKACOM has taken great strides in protecting
and promoting long-term sustainable water resources and
biodiversity.  
The recent discovery of the Ohangwena II aquifer will likely
alter the hydropolitical landscape of the region and provide a
first test of the governance framework. The transboundary
aquifer spans between Namibia and Angola and is projected
to supply enough water to meet the demands of Namibia for
hundreds of years, thus reducing upstream pressure on the
delta (MacDonald et al. 2012). However, those projections are
based on current levels of demand, and demand will likely
increase with discovery of a relatively cheap resource (i.e.,
pressure reduces pumping cost), especially for irrigation.
Increased agricultural production may have impacts that are
detrimental to water quality and biodiversity in the delta, thus
increasing the need for integrated, collaborative development.
Regional governments should capitalize on their experience
and relative success with the Okavango treaties to draft equally
comprehensive agreements over the Ohangwena II aquifer. 
The legal and governance frameworks described in this article
aim to overcome the dilemma posed by the intersection of law
and environmental science by providing guidance for the
design of legal instruments and the implementation of adaptive
governance for sound environmental management. Treaties
with mechanisms for adaptive flow allocation, extreme events,
information exchange, collaborative governance, and dispute
resolution have been shown to increase the institutional
capacity of basin states to absorb change. Likewise,
governance elements such as overlapping levels of control,
multi-directional information flow, meaningful public
participation, local capacity building, and authority to respond
may increase the adaptive capacity to manage a variable
system. OKACOM is not a perfect example of each element,
but perfection in governance does not exist, hence the need
for iterative processes and adaptive capacity in natural
resource management.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5453
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